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Morris R. Cohen on the Place of Logic in Law, Positivism, Deduction, and the History of Science April 18, 2013

Posted by Christopher Donohue in History of the Human Sciences, Philosophy of Law.
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Morris Raphael Cohen (July 25, 1880 – January 28, 1947) is today a relatively unappreciated philosopher outside some encamped circles in the philosophy of law, intellectual history, and the intellectual study of jurisprudence.   Sidney Hook in “The Philosophy of Morris R. Cohen,” in the New Republic, outlined the reasons for this.  He noted, “Honored for his candor, his scholarship and critical insight, his philosophical colleagues with a true gesture of piety to the spirit of intelligent dissent recently conferred upon him the presidency of the American Philosophical Association.” But, “he has no following.”  Hook continuedStray-Dog, “His writings have consequently bewildered those who have sought to understand him only in the light of his negations.”  Cohen had little patience for Marxist or overly sociological discussions of law, but he was not a strident legal positivist.  He did not think that jurisprudence was a closed system of logical relationships as would a legal formalist.  Cohen was however a kind of “reductionist.”   Law was logical, and much like the natural sciences, useful due to its regularity and generality. Law, however, much like the more contemporary sciences of non-Euclidean geometry and quantum mechanics, had to be open enough to address the inherent messiness of life. (more…)