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Document: The Butt Report (1941) January 3, 2014

Posted by Will Thomas in Uncategorized.
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My book manuscript, Rational Action: The Sciences of Policy in Britain and America, 1940-1960 is now under contract with the MIT Press.  I will be revising and formatting the manuscript through mid-February, so expect to continue hearing little from me until then. I do, however, want to start trying some new experiments with this blog, one of which is to make certain unpublished government documents more widely available.

Today’s document is the so-called “Butt Report” found at The National Archives of the UK, Public Record Office, AIR 14/1218.  Issued in August 1941, the report detailed, on the basis of photographic evidence, the extreme inability of RAF bomber crews to locate, let alone strike, targets in the dark. This investigation was ordered by Winston Churchill’s friend and adviser, Oxford physicist Frederick Lindemann, and was undertaken by his assistant, David Bensusan-Butt.  The Butt Report is well known, having played a role in shaping subsequent debate over the aims of British bombing policy in view of technical limitations.  However, I do not believe it has previously been made available in full (or nearly in full, as the last page appears to be missing).

The rules of the National Archives of the UK state that facsimile copies of its records may not be distributed without permission and the payment of a large fee. Transcriptions, however, may be distributed freely. Upon learning this, shortly after publishing this post, I quickly removed the photographic reproduction I had originally made available here. However, in December 2014 I found time to transcribe the report, adhering as closely as possible to the format of the original. Here it is:

Butt Report transcription (TNA PRO AIR 14 1218)

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Comments»

1. Lee J Rickard (@LeeJRickard) - January 4, 2014

Fascinating. This reminds one of the effort that went into merely documenting the problem – a hard thing for most of our computer-based generations to appreciate. I’m old enough to remember typing, but soon that will be a faint memory. Just another reason for the importance of looking at the original documents, and perhaps a reason to NOT reprocess the photographs!

Will Thomas - January 4, 2014

Thanks Lee – one thing I find useful about going to the original document is that it gives you a better sense of just what kind of a heuristic (if you will) apparatus was available at the time. A lot of secondary reports will tell you what this or that report concluded, without telling you much about how it got there. In this case, you can tell that that apparatus was not yet very sophisticated, although they did at least have a photo interpretation crew working. What’s most interesting to me here, is how modestly Butt assesses his own skills, as well as his recommendations for a more permanent statistical operation. (It so happened that Bomber Command was just setting up an operations research section when the Butt report was issued.)


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